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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SOME EFFECTS OF .THE ALIEN LAND ACT
IN WASHINGTON'
In General
Legislation restricting the ownership of land by aliens in the
State of Washington, has given rise to many interesting questions
of law. The Supreme Court of the State, beginning with the
Oregon Mortgage Co. v. Carstens case 2 m 1896, and presently end-
ing with the Ying v. Kay cases in 1933, has had manifold oppor-
tunities to answer a great portion of the perplexing problems that
have arisen under the Alien Land laws. However, there remain
many questions as yet undecided, and it is the purpose of this
article to not only epitomize the conclusions already adjudicated,
but also predict some probable results to situations which may
arise in the future.
The constitutional 4 and statutory5 provisions which prohibit the
'For Article "RIGHTS OF JAPANESE AND CHINEsE ALIENs I LAND IN
WASHINGTON" see 6 Wash. Law Rev. 127 (1931).
'16 Wash. 165, 47 Pac. 421 (1896.)
374 Wash. Dec. 98, 24 Pac. (2d) 596 (1933).
'WASH. CoNsT., Art. II, Sec. 33, provides: "The ownership of lands by
aliens, other than those who in good faith have declared their intention
to become citizens of the United States, is prohibited in this State, except
where acquired by inheritance, under mortgage or in good faith in the
ordinary course of justice in the collection of debts; and all conveyances
of lands hereafter made to any alien directly, or in trust for such alien
shall be void: Provided, that the provisions of this section shall not
apply to lands containing valuable deposits of minerals, metals, iron, coal,
or fire clay, and the necessary land for mills and machinery to be used
in the development thereof and the manufacture of the products there-
from. Every corporation, the majority of the capital stock of which is
owned by aliens, shall be considered an alien for the purposes of this
prohibition."
5 Rem. Rev. Stat. 10582: "An alien shall not own land or take or hold
title thereto. No person shall take or hold land for an alien. Land now
held by or for aliens in violation of the Constitution of the State is for-
feited to and declared to be the property of the State. Land hereafter
conveyed to or for the use of aliens in violation of the Constitution or
of this act shall thereby be forfeited to and become property of the
State."
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ownership of lands by aliens, other than those who in good faith
have declared their intention to become citizens, is in derogation
of the common law At common law, aliens could take property
by act of the parties, but not by operation of law. Thus title
acquired by deed or devise was good against the whole world ex-
cept the soverign until "office found", that is, until the fact of
alienage was authoritatively established by a public officer upon
an inquest held at the instance of the government. But there
could be no inheritance by, from, or through an alien, for the reason
that the law would never cast descent upon anyone who could not
hold the estate.6 The purpose of such a prohibition at common
law was to prevent the acquisition of lands in large quantities
by aliens and non-resident owners, so as to protect the state from
the danger of allowing persons who owed it no allegience, to own
land within its boundaries, and perhaps use the profits derived
therefrom in acts of hostility to the state. 7
In Washington, it has been established by a'unanimity of de-
cisions, that the constitutional provision prohibiting the owner-
ship of lands by aliens, and declaring such conveyances to be void,
means that the conveyance is void against the state only.8 Thus
before "office found" by the state in the nature of special escheat
proceedings, an alien can transfer an indefeasible title to a third
party qualified to take, and the state can not thereafter forfeit
such lands.9 Upon the death of an alien intestate before "office
found," all property possessed by him descends to his heirs,
whether citizens or alien, and does not escheat to the state or
revert back to the grantor.10
Since an alien can transfer an indefeasible title to a citizen be-
fore escheat proceedings have been instigated, an agreement by
an alien grantor to a citizen grantee can be specifically enforced. 1
Although an alien grantee can not specifically enforce a convey-
ance of land to himself, 2 since a court of equity will not lend its
aid to the commission of an unlawful act, still it has been held
that if the alien grantee assigns the contract to a citizen, the
citizen assignee can specifically enforce the agreement," and even
though the assignee and alien agreed to divide the profits from a
resale of the property 1 These holdings, though they seemingly
appear to violate the fundamental principle of contract law, which
axiomatically states that an assignee can get no better rights than
his assignor had in the contract, still may be rationalized by sev-
eral theories (1)Public policy favors the acquisition of property
6 1 R. C. L. p. 808.
IDEVLIN ON DEEDS (3d Ed.), Sec. 131.8Abrams v. State, 45 Wash. 327, 88 Pac. 327 (1907).
" Abram-s v. State, supra, note 8; Oregon Mortgage Co. v. Carstens, 16
Wash. 165, 47 Pac. 421 (1896) State ex rel. v. Comercial Co., 46 Wash.
104, 89 Pac. 471 (1907) Prentice v. How, 84 Wash. 136, 146 Pac. 388(1915)
10 Abrams v. State, note 8 supra, Ying v. Kay, 74 Wash. Dec. 98, 24
Pac. (2d) 596 (1933).
1" Oregon Mortgage Co. -v. Carstens, note 9 supra,2Ales v. Epstein, 222 S. W 1012 (Mo. 1920).
"Keene v. Zindorf, 81 Wash. 152, 142 Pac. 484 (1914).
"
4Mott v. Cline, 253 Pac. 718 (Cal. 1927).
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by citizens, and hence will not apply the alien restrictions as long
as the party seeking to enforce the conveyance is a citizen, (2)
that the notification by the assignee to the grantor, of the assign-
ment and the assent thereto by the grantor, constitutes a new con-
tract which is valid and enforceable; or (3) the alien may be
treated as a mere "conduit" through which the grantor is to pass
title to a qualified purchaser.
Although it has been repeatedly held that the only party en-
titled to question the title of an alien is the state, m an action to
condemn land, defendant can set up the alienage of the plaintiff
to defeat the action, upon the theory that the defendant is not
questioning the right of the alien to the land which the alien then
has, but questions the alien's ability to acquire new land from
him.'5
In 1921, a new law6 was enacted in Washington to "put teeth"
into the former restrictions on the ownership of land by aliens,
which made it a gross misdemeanor for a citizen to knounngly
transfer land to an alien, or for an alien in possession of land to
refuse to disclose to the attorney general or the prosecuting at-
torney of the county wherein the land is situated, the nature and
extent of his interest in the land. This statute did not change in
any respect the former law upon this subject. Aliens may still
dispose of the property so held by them before "office found"'1
State ex. rel. Morrell v. Superior Court, 33 Wash. 542, 74 Pac. 686(1903) State ex Tel. Roberts v. Superior Court, 165 Wash. 648, 5 Pac.
(2d) 1037 (1931).
"Rem. Rev. Stat. 10587 "Whoever, (a) Knowingly transfers or con-
veys land or title to an alien; or (b) Knowingly takes land or title in
trust for an alien; or (c) Holding in trust for an alien or title to land,
either heretofore or hereafter acquired, fails for 30 days after acquiring
knowledge or notice that he holds in trust for an alien to disclose the
fact to the attorney general or the prsecuting attorney of the county where
the land is situated; or (d) Being an alien and having title to land or
control, possession, use or enjoyment of land, whether heretofore or
hereafter acquired, refuses to disclose to the attorney general or the
prosecuting attorney of the county where the land is situated the nature
and extent of his interest in and title to the land; or (e) Being an
officer or agent of a corporation or other organized group of persons
which has title to land or control, possession, use or enjoyment of land,
whether heretofore or hereafter acquired, refuses to disclose to the attor-
ney general or the prosecuting attorney of the county wherein the land
Is situated the nature and extent of interest of persons not citizens of
the United States in the corporation or other organized group of persons;
or (f) Being an officer or agent of a corporation or other organized
group of persons which holds in trust for an alien title to land or control
or possession of land, whether heretofore or hereafter acquired, refuses
to disclose to the attorney general or the prosecuting attorney wherein
the land is situated the nature and extent of the alien's interest in and the
title to the land, or (g) Willfully counsels, aids or abets another in vio-
lating or evading this act, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor."
27 After the State has commenced escheat proceedings against an alien,
it is a question whether the alien can defeat the action by declaring
his intention to become a citizen thereafter. In State ex rel. Tanner v.
Stalheli, 112 Wash. 344, 192 Pac. 991 (1920) the court intimates that the
declaration cannot be made after action is begun. In that case, however,
it was not necessary to decide this point, since the court found that as
matter of fact, the alien's declaration was not made in good faith. How-
ever, there are decisions in other jurisdictions to the effect that since the
State does not acquire title to the land until final judgment, that there-
fore the naturalization of an alien before judgment will defeat the right
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and convey good indefeasible title to citizens;18 as well as inherit
land from either aliens or citizens.1 9 However, the time wherein
aliens must dispose of their land acquired either through inheri-
tance, or by mortgage in good faith in the collection of debts, has
been extended to sixteen years.2 0
INSURABLE INTEREST
The question arises as to whether or not an alien has an insur-
able interest in the property held by him in violation of law A
thorough search into the "books" has been sterile of any prece-
dents upon the particular point. Any solution to the problem
therefore must be accomplished through study of analogies and
the general principles of insurance law. That the insured must
have an insurable interest in the subject matter of the policy is
the first axiom in the law of insurance.21 An insurable interest
is generally defined as such an interest m property that a person
is so situated with reference to it that its destruction will occasion
him an actual loss of money or legal right, or incur hun liability ' 2
At first blush therefore, it seems apparent that an alien has such
an interest which can be insured. 23 However, the principle that
there can be no insurable interest where the only right arises
under a contract which is void, unenforceable, or illegal,2 does
serve to cast doubt upon the prima facie conclusion reached above.
Authorities are agreed as to the general rule, that if an insur-
ance contract is intended to advance the illegal purpose of the in-
sured, the contract is void,2 5 although if such insurance policy does
not further the illegality, but is merely collateral to it, it is not
void. The true test is laid down by Judge Marshall in Armstrong
v Toler,26 to the effect that.
"Where the consideration is illegal, immoral and wrong,
or where the direct purpose of the contract is to effect,
advance, or encourage acts in violation of law, it is void.
But if the contract sought to be enforced is collateral and
independent, though in some measure connected with acts
done in violation of law, the contract is not void."
Certainly the alien's ownership of land, although forbidden, is
good as against the whole world, challengeable by the state only
of the State to enforce the escheat proceedings. Huxley v. State, 40 Ala.
689 (1867) Jackson v. Beach, 1 Johns. Cas. 399 (N. Y. 1800) Manuel v.
Wulff, 152 U. S. 505, 38 L. Ed. 532 (1894) see also Osterman v. Baldwin.
6 Wall (U. S.) 116, 18 L. Ed. 730 (1867) Baker v. Westcott, 11 S. W
157 (Tex. 1889).
1" State v. Shokuta, 131 Wash. 291, 230 Pac. 166 (1924) State v. Kosai,
133 Wash. 442, 234 Pac. 5 (1925)
19 Ying v. Kay, note 10 supra.
0Laws '33, p. 431, sec. 1. (Rem. Rev. Stat. 10584 (1933).
2" Wash. Fire Relief v. Albro, 137 Wash. 31, 241 Pac. 356 (1925).
" Wash. Rem. Rev. Stat. sec 7033: "Insurable interest is every interest
in property or any relation thereto, or liability in respect thereof, of such
nature that a contemplated peril might directly damnify the insured."
2Cetkowsktv. Knutson, 204 N. W 528, 40 A. L. R. 599 (Minn. 1925).
2, JOYCE, INSURANCE, 2d Ed. Sec. 892, 893; CoucH ON INSURANCE, 1st Ed.
See. 301, see Hessen v. Iowa Ins. Co., 190 N. W 150, 30 A. L. R. 657
(Iowa 1922).
25 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, sec. 1752; Brown v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 14
Pac. (2d) 272 (Ore. 1932)
211 WHEAT, 258.
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Until the State brings a special action of escheat, the alien has
such an interest wherein he receives a benefit from its continued
existence, and will suffer a loss from its destruction. The fact that
an alien can convey an 'ndefeasshbe title to third persons, and
can perfect Ins own title thereto by becoming a citizen before
"office found" proves unmistakably that this is a valuable inter-
est which he should be able to protect. It is only upon the extreme
view that the policy of the state is to discourage the holding of
land by aliens at all events, that it would inflict so severe a penalty
by denying recovery upon an insurance policy affecting the land.
When we recall the words of Chancellor Kent, that the "law is
very gentle in the construction of the disability of alienism, and
rather contracts than extends its severity,"' 27 it would seem very
"impolitic" to impose this added "crown of thorns" upon the
already burdened "brow" of aliens.2
The aliens ownership of lands, although forbidden, is not crim-
nal as such. The statute29 merely provides that the alien is guilty
of a gross misdemeanor upon hss refusal to divulge the location
and interests of the land which he then holds. Since a "refusal"
implies a previous request on the part of somebody else, it is evi-
dent, that until so requested, the alien commits no crime by the
mere holding of land. The statute imposes no duty to voluntarily
disclose this information on the part of the alien, as required from
a trustee who discovers that he is holding for the benefit of an
alien. Hence by no means can it be said that an alien's ownersnp
of land as such is ahn to the possession of contraband liquor under
the "ancient" liquor laws. 0
AcTioN Fop PURCHASE PRICE
Another question as yet unadjudicated in this state or else-
where, is whether or not a grantor who conveys land to an alien
can recover the purchase price in an action at law. It is well
settled that there can be no recovery upon a contract which violates
some penal statute.3 1 It follows therefore that the grantor would
2 KENT, 56-62, 6 L. Ed. 468 (1826.)
23 The status of an alien's Interest in land resembles somewhat
the Interest of a bona fide purchaser of a stolen car from a thief. Though
in many jurisdlctions (see annotation in 46 A. L.. R. 526) it has been
held that the purchaser acquires no interest which can be insured in the
stolen car, still the leading case of Barnett v. London Assurance Corp.,
138 Wash. 673, 245 Pac. 3 (1926), points out that since the purchaser
gets a title which is good against the whole world but the true owner,
that therefore this Indefeasible title can be insured, even as "sole and
unconditional owner" under the policy. If the courts follow the reason-
ing In the stolen car cases, it must a fortiorz hold that an alien has an
Insurable interest.
--Note 18, supra.
'Under the liquor cases, the courts have generally held that there
is no insurable interest in such goods held in violation of penal statutes,
Kelly v. Ins. Co., 97 Mass. 284 (1867) Wood v. First Nat. Fire Ins., 94
S. E. 622 (Ga. 1917) although there is some authority to the contrary.
Brb v. Gernma Ins. Co., 67 N. W 583 (Iowa 1896) Brown v. New Jersey
Ins. Co. Note 25, supra. Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Hoover Distilling Co., 182
Fed. 590 (CCA 8th 1910).
31 Miller v. Howell, 113 S. E. 621 (N. C. 1922) Lloyd v. Railroad Co.,
151 N. C. 536, 66 S. E. 604 (1909) Balagurer v. Macey, 238 S. W 322
(Tex. 1922) McLaughlin v. Ardomore Loan Trust, 95 Pac. 779 (Okla.
1908), Arotzky v'. Kropnitzky, 120 Atl. 921 (N. J. 1923).
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be barred from recovering, if at the time he conveyed title to an
alien, he acted with knowledge of the grantee's alienage. But
whether or not the grantor could recover the purchase price from
an alien, where the grantor acts innocently, and without any
knowledge that the grantee is an alien, seems to depend upon the
further question, whether or not the grantor could rescind upon
discovery of the disability of the grantee. Should the courts hold
that once the deed is executed to an alien, the grantor loses all his
rights in the subject matter as to rescission, then it would seem
that upon principle, the grantee should not be able to set up his
alienage to defeat action for the purchase price. In such a case,
the conveyance is not a nullity as against the grantor, but operates
as such only against the state. On the other hand, if the courts
should give the grantor the right to rescind3 2 on the theory that
a fraud has been perpetrated on him, then recovery for the pur-
chase price should be defeated, since the proper remedy in such
a case would be rescission, which effects the purpose of the statute.
Upon the further question as to the right of a bona fide pur
chaser to recover upon a negotiable instrument executed by an
alien for the purchase price of land sold to him by the payee, there
should be no doubt. In Washington, the illegality of the consider-
ation of a negotiable note does not vitiate it in the hands of a bona
fide purchaser, whether the illegal act is malum in se or malun
prohibitum, unless the statute making the act illegal, expressly
or by implication makes the instrument void in the hands of all
holders with or without notice.8 It is submitted therefore, that
since there is no statute of either sort in Washington, that there-
fore the alienage of the maker would be no defense upon a nego-
tiable instrument in the hands of a bona fide purchaser.
JOSEPH J. LANZA.
32Rescisslon might be granted on the ground of unilateral mistake
where the parties have not changed their position, although there are very
few cases to that effect. The general rule Is that there can be no rescis-
sion for unilateral mistake. However, in the case of unilateral mistake
known by the other party and relied on, rescission may be granted the
same as in the case of mutual mistake. In Baker v. Knight, 160 Wash.
500, 295 Pac. 174 (1931) the court annulled the executory contract to
convey land to an alien, where both parties acted innocently. In Hart v.
Nagasawa, 24 Pac. (2d) 815 (Cal. 1933), court refused the grantor the
right to rescind, where the contract was fully executed, the court saying
that thereafter the State was the only party who could question the
validity of the alien's title. See also Town of Meredit4 .. Fullerton, 139
Atl. 359 (N. H. 1927) Deaton v. Lawson, 40 Wash. 486, 82 Pac. 879 (1905)
Calif. Delta Farms v. Chinese Anzerzcan Farms, 268 Pac. 1050 (Cal. 1928)
278 Pac. 227 (Cal. 1929).
"Gray v. Boyle, 55 Wash. 578, 104 Pac. 828 (1909) M executed a
negotiable note to P in part payment of premiums upon a policy of insur-
ance. An excess rebate was allowed M in violation of the Anti-rebate Act,
which punished violations thereof as misdemeanors. P indorsed note to
E, a bona fide purchaser. Held, that defense of illegality was not available
against a holder in due course, since it is not the policy of the law to
render negotiable paper void in the hands of innocent holders where
the staute has not so expressly declared. See also C. I. T. Corp v. Byrnes,
38 S. W (2d) 750 (Mo. 1931) BRANNAN, NEG. INST. (5th Ed.), p 556.
